Charles Sanders Peirce citáty
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Charles Sanders Peirce bol americký filozof, logik, jeden zo zakladateľov pragmatizmu, ktorý sa zrodil z diskusií v tzv. metafyzickom klube v Cambridgi. Peircove myšlienky boli inšpiratívne v mnohých odboroch: epistemológia, metafyzika, semiotika. Peircove myšlienky zasiahli veľmi silno do diskusie v hermeneutike, analytickej filozofii, frankfurtskej škole. Výrazne ovplyvnil Maxa Benseho.

Tvrdí, že pevné presvedčenie je presvedčenie, o ktorom vieme, že konanie v ňom implikované umožňuje uspokojenie našich prianí. Wikipedia  

✵ 10. september 1839 – 19. apríl 1914
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Charles Sanders Peirce: Citáty v angličtine

“The next simplest feature that is common to all that comes before the mind, and consequently, the second category, is the element of Struggle.”

Lecture II : The Universal Categories, § 2 : Struggle, CP 5.45
Pragmatism and Pragmaticism (1903)

“The entire universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs.”

Quoted in Essays in Zoosemiotics (1990) by Thomas A. Sebeok

“The Protestant churches generally hold that the elements of the sacrament are flesh and blood only in a tropical sense; they nourish our souls as meat and the juice of it would our bodies. But the Catholics maintain that they are literally just that; although they possess all the sensible qualities of wafer-cakes and diluted wine. But we can have no conception of wine except what may enter into a belief, either —
# That this, that, or the other, is wine; or,
# That wine possesses certain properties.
Such beliefs are nothing but self-notifications that we should, upon occasion, act in regard to such things as we believe to be wine according to the qualities which we believe wine to possess. The occasion of such action would be some sensible perception, the motive of it to produce some sensible result. Thus our action has exclusive reference to what affects the senses, our habit has the same bearing as our action, our belief the same as our habit, our conception the same as our belief; and we can consequently mean nothing by wine but what has certain effects, direct or indirect, upon our senses; and to talk of something as having all the sensible characters of wine, yet being in reality blood, is senseless jargon. Now, it is not my object to pursue the theological question; and having used it as a logical example I drop it, without caring to anticipate the theologian's reply. I only desire to point out how impossible it is that we should have an idea in our minds which relates to anything but conceived sensible effects of things. Our idea of anything is our idea of its sensible effects; and if we fancy that we have any other we deceive ourselves, and mistake a mere sensation accompanying the thought for a part of the thought itself. It is absurd to say that thought has any meaning unrelated to its only function. It is foolish for Catholics and Protestants to fancy themselves in disagreement about the elements of the sacrament, if they agree in regard to all their sensible effects, here or hereafter.
It appears, then, that the rule for attaining the third grade of clearness of apprehension is as follows: Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.”

The final sentence here is an expression of what became known as the Pragmatic maxim, first published in "Illustrations of the Logic of Science" in Popular Science Monthly, Vol. 12 (January 1878), p. 286

“By an object, I mean anything that we can think, i. e. anything we can talk about.”

"Reflections on Real and Unreal Objects", Undated, MS 966

“You are of all my friends the one who illustrates pragmatism in its most needful forms. You are a jewel of pragmatism.”

Letter to William James (16 March 1903), published in The thought and character of William James, as revealed in unpublished correspondence and notes (1935) by Ralph Barton Perry, Vol. 2, p. 427